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Abstract: This paper examines the effect that the ‘Cadbury reforms’ have had on the pay determination 
process of executives in the UK Our results suggest that, on average, the impact has been disappointing. 
The relationship between pay and performance remains weak and the link to firm size has, if anything, 
been strengthened. However, our results suggest considerable heterogeneity in the impact of the reforms, 
and for those firms above median employment the link between pay and profits appears to have 
strengthened. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance, according to an authoritative survey in this Journal by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, p737), is concerned with: “…the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” As such it might 
be expected that that it would be a private contractual matter between a firm’s 
stockholders, debt-holders and senior executives. Indeed, many finance and economics 
scholars, not all of them from Chicago, would argue that private contracting between the 
interested parties, under some appropriate legal and accounting framework, would be the 
most effective way of minimising the agency costs of their relationship- see Hart (1995). 
On such a view, agency cost reducing reforms are likely to be introduced voluntarily; 
therefore imposed ex post changes are likely to be ineffective or, at most, to redistribute 
rents between the parties.  However, this has not stopped repeated attempts to secure 
the imposition of statutory corporate governance reforms in the US and the UK. These 
are variously supported with reference to the vulnerabilities of existing governance 
arrangements to the public good problems of monitoring with dispersed share 
ownership, the advent of contingencies that were unanticipated at the time of the initial 
equity or debt offering or general systemic problems – e.g. “short-termism” or excessive 
executive salary growth - attaching to incomplete monitoring arrangements. [Blair (1995), 
Hart (1995)]. Whether externally imposed changes to the institutional arrangements of 
governance really do improve their effectiveness is therefore a matter of some debate. 
Critics of externally imposed reforms, including Hart (1995) have expressed doubt 
whether formal compliance with such changes will necessarily produce genuinely 
different outcomes.  
 
This paper examines the impact of the introduction of the package of corporate 
governance changes embodied in the Code of Best Practice  [Cadbury (1992)]  on the   3
determination of executive compensation in the UK. The implementation of the 
Cadbury Code offers an unusual opportunity for a natural experiment in this field. It 
required thoroughgoing changes in UK corporate governance arrangements that, with 
significant support from the London Stock Exchange, appear to have been very widely 
implemented  within a short period. Furthermore, the establishment of the Cadbury 
Committee, see below, was partially motivated by concerns over executive compensation 
determination and the Committee’s Report  and the Code of Best Practice it proposed 
explicitly aimed to change the executive compensation process in UK firms. 
 
The Cadbury Committee was set up in 1991 by the then Conservative Government to 
enquire into and report upon “…the financial aspects of corporate governance
1”. This 
was against the background of widespread public debate over the extent of abuse of 
centralised power within large UK firms. There were three principal areas of concern to 
contemporaries: First, the use of so-called “creative accounting” practices which 
obfuscated the calculation of shareholder value and which were separately attracting 
much effort by the UK accounting profession in a drive to harmonise accounting 
standards- see Whittington (1993); Second, corporate failures, particularly several 
associated with high profile, domineering CEOs, such as Asil Nadir and Robert Maxwell, 
who appeared to deliberately discourage financial transparency in their operations; and 
third, the rapid rate of growth of executive compensation, both in general and especially 
for the directors of recently privatised and/or deregulated companies. Particular criticism 
was voiced of the failure to relate pay increases more strongly to performance [see 
Keasey and Wright (1993)]. 
  
                                                 
1 The circumstances surrounding the Committee’s establishment and a description of its composition is 
given in Dahya et al (2002).   4
The Committee itself rejected the statutory imposition of new governance arrangements 
in favour of a Code of Best Practice that all quoted companies would be encouraged to 
adopt. The Code set out a number of changes that were intended to subject corporate 
executives to greater and more effective monitoring by the representatives of the 
shareholders, especially the non-executive directors.  Thus it sought to make the 
executive-agents more responsive to the interests of the shareholder-principals. Although 
the Cadbury Code was formally voluntary
2, its endorsement by the London Stock 
Exchange helped it to secure very high levels of compliance soon after publication. A 
survey by Conyon (1997) suggests that the overwhelming majority of large UK firms 
implemented its proposals very rapidly. Indeed, many introduced the widely trailed 
Cadbury reforms before its publication.  
  
The Cadbury Code aimed to decentralize control within the corporation by requiring the 
splitting of the functions of the CEO and board chair, offices previously frequently 
combined in large UK firms. It also increased the number and importance of non-
executive directors. UK boardrooms, certainly in comparison to their US counterparts, 
had traditionally operated with relatively few non-executive directors. Moreover, many of 
those who were in place had ties to the company, often being its retired executives, and 
hence had questionable genuine independence [Cosh and Hughes (1987)].  Cadbury 
introduced the requirement that all quoted companies were to have at least three non-
executives on the board and, to reduce the risk of ‘capture’, required that their service 
contracts should not exceed three years without being subjected to shareholders’ 
approval. Moreover, to reduce the potential for executive patronage, the non-executives 
                                                 
2 Compliance was almost certainly increased by the implicit threat that compulsion would follow if the 
voluntary code were not adopted.   5
were to be put forward to the shareholders’ meeting by a nominations committee, itself 
normally containing a majority of non-executives. 
 
Turning to executive compensation determination, the central focus of this paper, 
Cadbury made the following suggestions: First, the total compensation of directors and 
that of both the chair and the highest paid UK director should be fully disclosed, with a 
breakdown of the base salary and performance-based elements; Second, executive 
directors’ pay was to be determined by a remuneration committee of the board of 
directors, itself wholly or mainly comprised of non-executive directors
3 and chaired by a 
non-executive, and those members should draw upon outside advice as necessary; And 
third, membership of the remuneration committee should be published in the annual 
report. It envisaged that the committee would respond to any shareholder concerns at 
the company’s annual general meeting.  
 
Therefore Cadbury addressed the widespread contemporary criticisms of existing 
executive compensation arrangements by seeking to make the pay determination process 
more transparent, more accountable, less subject to executive influence and by setting up 
an institutional apparatus that could relate compensation to the firm’s circumstances.  
 
While the impact of Cadbury on the formal institutions of corporate governance in UK 
companies was clear and almost immediate, its effects on governance outcomes are 
largely uncharted. Dahya et al (2002) in this Journal have recently reported that, largely 
contrary to their expectations, the Cadbury reforms did appear to impact on managerial 
                                                 
3 The subsequent Greenbury Report (1995) strengthened this requirement to make remunerations 
committees solely the preserve of the non-executives.   6
tenure. The latter became shorter and more strongly (negatively) related to firm 
performance after the adoption of the Code.  
 
There has been little explicit examination of the impact of Cadbury on executive labour 
market outcomes. Ezzamel and Watson (1997) explored changes in the level of CEO 
salaries in the immediate post-Cadbury environment and report some evidence of 
catching up among the less well paid. However, it is important to note that nowhere did 
Cadbury advocate the need for changes in the level of executive pay: Indeed the Report 
was explicit in its belief that this should be determined in accordance with the firm’s 
market needs. What Cadbury did seek to implement was a pay-setting procedure that 
would more closely align executive and shareholder interests by significantly raising the 
indirect and direct role of shareholder voice. However, it was widely conjectured [e.g. 
Main and Johnson (1993)] that this would have the effect of increasing the importance of 
corporate performance in executive pay determination. 
 
The aim of this paper is to present a rigorous examination impact of the Cadbury 
reforms on the process of executive compensation determination. We estimate a 
dynamic compensation model across a large unbalanced panel of UK firms over the 
years 1981 to 1996, a period spanning the incorporation of the Cadbury changes. The 
paper has regard for three major issues: Firstly, has the link between pay and 
performance become closer post-Cadbury, as the reformers envisaged? Secondly, has the 
dynamic response of pay altered post 1992? Efficiency considerations may suggest a 
more rapid adjustment to equilibrium, though this effect could be attenuated or even 
reversed if the remuneration committee is sensitive to ‘political’ issues. Indeed Rose et al 
(1996) argue for the US that this effect might be sufficient to slow adjustment in larger 
firms. Finally, drawing upon a result of Girma et al (2002), which suggests merger   7
completion has a significant ceteris paribus impact on CEO compensation, even where no 
performance improvement results, we examine whether the acquisition impact on 
executive pay has changed in the post-Cadbury period. 
 
Unlike previous work in the executive compensation literature we also directly address 
the issue of within-sample heterogeneity, itself to be expected not least as the agency 
problem is unlikely to be uniform across firms of widely differing size. Quantile 
regression is used to explore changes in the underlying model as we move across the 
compensation distribution. Quantile regression both allows for variability in the response 
function at different points in the distribution and accommodates the possibility, quite 
likely with CEO compensation data
4, that the dispersion of outcomes rises as one moves 
across the compensation distribution. This exercise reveals some consistent and very 
substantial changes in determinants of compensation as we move up that distribution. In 
so doing it calls into question previous conclusions in the executive compensation 
literature which implicitly assumes a homogeneous response by employing regression 
techniques that evaluate effects at the conditional mean.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the modelling framework and 
provides simple descriptive statistics for remuneration growth pre- and post-reform. 
Section 3 provides econometric estimations of CEO pay equations, and addresses the 
issues outline above. Section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                 
4 See the discussion in Koenker and Hallock (2001).   8
2.  Modelling Framework and Data 
Model Specification 
The large empirical literature on CEO remuneration (see Murphy (1999) for a survey) 
typically specifies pay as a function of the size and performance of the firm. Since we are 
also interested in dynamic issues (how pay determination changes post Cadbury), we 
therefore specify an estimating equation of the following form:  
                                it it it it X PAY PAY ε β α + ′ + = ∆ − − 1 1                                (1) 
Where  i and t index companies and years respectively and ε  is a random error term. 
X  is a vector of variables hypothesised to impact on plant level CEO pay trajectories 
such as company sales growth, industry sales growth
5, profit growth and significant 
events in corporate history such as substantial acquisitions.  
 
In order to test whether the link between pay and performance has become closer post-
Cadbury, we interact profit growth with a dummy variable for the post-1992 period. If 
the link between pay and performance has increased then we would expect to observe a 
positive coefficient on this variable. We are also able to test whether the reforms 
impacted on other components of  X  in a similar way. We examine in this regard 
whether the premium for acquisition has decreased in the latter period. 
 
The coefficient on lagged pay, α , provides an estimate of the speed with which CEO 
pay adjusts over time. Values of α  in the range  1 2 − < < − α  are consistent with a 
cyclical convergence in pay towards equilibrium. If  0 1 < < − α  the convergence is 
monotonic, with value of α  closer to –1 implying faster convergence. Thus values of α  
of  -.09 and -.15 imply that CEO pay moves half way to its steady state level in 7.35 and 
                                                 
5 Measured at a 3-digit level of disaggregation.   9
4.27 years respectively
6.  Thus, in order to test whether the speed of pay adjustment has 
changed following the Cadbury report, we test to see whether α  has changed post 1992. 
  
It was noted above that Cadbury did not advocate lowering either executive pay or its rate 
of increase. The Report did, however, anticipate that transferring pay-setting 
responsibilities to a remuneration committee dominated by non-executive directors 
would align shareholder and manager interests more closely and so link pay more directly 
to performance. Since profit growth is an unambiguous performance measure, we test to 
see whether this variable carries additional weight in the post-Cadbury period. Sales 
growth may have elements of a performance indicator about it, as well as possibly being 
a preferred objective of empire-building managers. However, given prior criticism of the 
dominance of size-related factors in the executive pay determination process, it might be 
expected that sales growth would become correspondingly less important in the post-
Cadbury era. Industry sales growth is included here as a control. Prior research [Girma et 
al (2002)] also suggested that completing an acquisition appeared to exert a positive 
impact on executive compensation, despite extensive research suggesting that acquiring 
firms’ shareholders gained little, if anything, from the average acquisition. If shareholders 
concurred with this pessimistic assessment then we would expect to observe a reduction 
in the (positive) acquisition effect in the post-Cadbury period.   
 
It is worth noting at this juncture that we would not expect the response of pay 
determination to the Cadbury reforms to be uniform across all firms. Agency 
considerations are likely to arise primarily in larger firms where share ownership is more 
dispersed and where monitoring is more difficult. The measured impact of governance 
                                                 
6 This is obtained solving  ) 1 ln( / ) 5 . 0 ln( + = α t    10
reforms might therefore be greater in such firms. It is also possible that the impact of 
reforms might be observed earlier in larger firms: first, because larger firms will tend to 
adopt innovations, including organisational change, before their smaller rivals; and 
second, because the annual reports of larger firms, detailing compensation arrangements, 
are more likely to attract publicity.  
 
Data Description 
The executive compensation data used in this study is obtained from the Hemmington-Scott 
Corporate Register. We adopt the normal convention of defining CEO compensation as the 
reported pay, including bonuses, of the highest paid director (HPD). Whilst the HPD is 
not always identifiable as the CEO, the universal availability of this information as a 
reporting requirement for UK companies makes this definition both simple to 
implement and allows coverage to be greater than other possibilities
7. We do not attempt 
to incorporate either option grants or realised option gains into the compensation 
measure: firstly, and crucially, because before Cadbury the information on executive 
stock options in UK companies’ annual reports was generally insufficient to permit 
valuation; secondly, as Murphy (1999) demonstrates, existing attempts to value executive 
stock options, with the restrictions these carry, as tradable European call options involve 
somewhat arbitrary assumptions; and thirdly, empirical work [e.g. Conyon and Murphy 
(2000) suggests that in the UK the use of options has not materially increased since the 
early 1990s. Firm performance data was taken from Datastream. 
 
                                                 
7 If the occupancy of the CEO position changes within the firm’s financial year the reported salary of the 
HPD usually falls, as each occupant of the position now receives a fraction of the full yearly level. 
Fortunately, scrutiny of several years’ data usually allowed the identification of the individual CEO and 
hence the elimination of such cases.   11
Since previous work [Girma et al (2002)] had suggested that merger activity had a 
significant impact on executive compensation in the UK, even after allowing for merger-
associated changes in sales and performance, it was necessary that acquiring and non-
acquiring firms were identifiable in our sample. Accordingly, the London Business 
School’s London Share Price Database was initially used to identify all acquisitions among 
the set of UK quoted companies between 1981 and 1996. To avoid conflating the effects 
of multiple acquisitions, we excluded cases where two or more acquisitions were made 
within a three-year period, although multiple acquirers were otherwise retained. 
generating 286 acquiring firms.  The target sample was completed by the addition of an 
industry-stratified random control of 706 firms.  
 
  Inclusion in the final sample further required the availability of data on CEO 
compensation from the Hemmington-Scott Corporate Register and firm characteristics from 
Datastream. In the case of firms making acquisitions, these data were additionally required 
for at least two accounting years subsequent to the acquisition. The final sample 
consisted of 286 firms that had made at least one relevant acquisition and an industry-
stratified random control of a further 706 firms.  
 
The unbalanced panel of 992 companies generated 7891 observations over the period 
1981-1996. Table 1 presents some basic descriptive statistics for CEO pay growth pre- 
and post Cadbury reform. As can be seen from examination of the mean, annual 
compensation growth slowed post-1992 from 7.9% to 5.5%. This change in the mean 
hides considerable heterogeneity across the distribution of pay however. Although it is 
true that pay growth has slowed for all percentiles, this fall has been particularly 
pronounced for those at the lower end of the compensation distribution. This has had   12
the effect of spreading out the pay distribution. Clearly this is an important feature of the 
data and we need to allow for this response in our regression analysis. 
   13
3. Results 
An examination of Table 1 reveals the heterogeneity of growth rates of CEO pay within 
the sample. Prior to the Cadbury reforms, the growth of CEO pay at its mean was 
running at about 8%. However, those in the lower percentiles of the pay distribution 
suffered wage losses. This was in stark contrast to the better paid CEOs, with those in 
the 95
th percentile experience a 26% growth in pay. Post-Cadbury the heterogeneity is 
equally stark. Mean wage growth has fallen, with those in the lowest 5 percentiles 
experiencing particularly large falls. 
 
 The heterogeneity of response observed in the basic sample statistics has implications 
for the econometric estimation of the CEO remuneration equation. Standard OLS or 
GMM techniques that concentrate on the conditional mean of the dependent variable 
make no allowance for the fact that behaviour may differ across the pay distribution. In 
the presence of a CEO pay process that is heterogeneous, these techniques may 
therefore give misleading results, or at least throw away much useful information. Thus, 
in order to examine the dynamics of CEO pay at points in the distribution other than the 
conditional means, we also employ quantile regression techniques (Koenker and Bassett, 
1978). Quantile regression may be used to characterise the entire conditional distribution 
of the dependent variable given a set of regressors and thus may be used to examine 
parts of the pay distribution other than the conditional mean. We can therefore examine, 
for instance, whether the speed of adjustment for the 10
th percentile of pay differs from 
that of the 90
th percentile.  
 
Quantile regression has the additional benefit that it is robust to deviation of the 
residuals from normality and is therefore not affected by the presence of outliers that 
would impact on the conditional mean. Since the data set contains a finite number of   14
observations, only a finite number of quantiles are distinct. We consider regression 
estimates at five different percentiles: .10, .25, .50 (median), .75 and .90. The results of 
this estimation are presented in Table 2. 
 
Looking first at the results for the conditional mean in column one of Table 2, and 
considering pay determination pre-Cadbury, we obtain results that are typical of the 
existing literature. Company performance, as measured by the growth of profits has an 
insignificant impact on executive remuneration confirming the weak link between pay 
and performance. In contrast the impact of company size, as measured by sales growth, 
is both positive and highly significant, again in line with previous results. This impact is 
reinforced when it is additionally noted that firm growth via acquisition also leads to 
increases in CEO pay. 
 
What about post-Cadbury? Contrary to the hopes of the Committee, little impact on pay 
determination is evident. Although the interaction of reform- with profit growth is of the 
right sign, it is statistically insignificant. There is also no indication that the link from size 
to CEO pay via acquisition has been weakened in the latter period: indeed, the post-
Cadbury effect is positive although completely insignificant. Finally, there is no real 
indication that the speed of pay adjustment has altered post-1992. Does this suggest that 
the reforms have had none of the desired effects? To check the robustness of these 
results, Table 2 presents the results of quantile regression estimates. Examining the 
median ( 5 . 0 = q ) yields broadly similar results pre-Cadbury to the mean, though there is 
some indication of a link between profit growth and CEO pay. This would suggest that 
the link between pay and performance in column one being influenced by a number of 
extreme cases that impact on the conditional mean but not the median. Scrutinising the   15
quantile results suggests that the link between pay and profit growth is absent below the 
50
th and above the 90
th percentiles.  
 
Table 2 also provides some indication that for part of the pay distribution, the link 
between pay and performance has strengthened post 1992, though once again this effect 
is significant merely between the 50
th and 90
th percentiles. There is however little to 
indicate that the link between CEO pay and firm size has weakened in the latter period. 
A significant decline is observed only at the 75
th percentile, whilst a positive coefficient 
verges on significance at the 25
th percentile. 
 
As a further test of robustness, Tables 3 and 4 split the analysis according to the size of 
the firm since, as indicated above, there are substantial reasons to expect that pay 
determination could differ in large firms where monitoring costs are larger. Although we 
do find heterogeneity according to size, the link between pay and performance seems 
stronger for larger firms. For firms of less than median employment (880 employees), in 
Table 3, the link between pay and performance is weak and is not statistically significant 
in either the pre- or the post-Cadbury periods. For firms above the median employment, 
in Table 4, the effect is stronger. Although no link exists between pay and performance 
pre-1992, when evaluating at the conditional mean, a highly significant relationship is 
evident above the 75
th percentile. Subsequent to this period the link strengthens, whether 
the conditional mean or median is used. This appears to be a consequence of greater 
performance-related pay for CEOs in the lower quantiles of the pay distribution. No 
additional effect is discernible above the 75
th percentile. 
 
Firms below the median employment exhibit a uniformly positive and significant sales 
growth effect whose magnitude increases monotonically across the quantiles. These firms   16
display no post-Cadbury effect. Firms above the median employment display a very 
similar pattern of pre-Cadbury coefficients. However, in the post-Cadbury era pay of the 
CEOs in the lower quantiles of the pay distribution exhibits a sharply increased 
sensitivity to sales growth, an effect that is also evident at the conditional mean. This 
suggests that Cadbury may have had a somewhat perverse effect in that by formalising 
executive pay determination it has strengthened the role of firm size. We would note, as 
does Conyon (1997), that size is an unambiguous and publicly available comparator and 
thus may be attractive to remuneration committees and the consultants that advise them. 
 
Splitting the sample by employment also reveals substantial heterogeneity in the 
acquisition effect. The CEOs of firms below the median employment are largely 
unaffected by merger activity
8, and an acquisition effect is only discernible above the 75
th 
percentile of the pay distribution. By contrast, the larger firms in the sample exhibit a 
consistently large and positive acquisition effect. However, there is little evidence to 
suggest that Cadbury had any change in the acquisition effect, either for small or large 
firms. 
  
Finally, what impact have the Cadbury’s reforms had on the dynamics of the pay-setting 
process? Here again substantial outliers appear to be present, leading to a marked 
difference between the results evaluated at the conditional mean and median. Although 
substantial heterogeneity is evident, firms below median employment generally exhibit 
faster adjustment than their larger counterparts. This might reflect the fact that larger 
firms are more likely to attract adverse news coverage as a result of large pay changes, 
and so pay changes are staggered. In the post-Cadbury period there is small, but generally   17
significant, fall in the speed of adjustment for the smaller firms. By contrast, there is no 
obvious effect for larger firms in the sample. Therefore, if the Cadbury reforms were 
intended to make executive compensation respond more rapidly to changes in the firm’s 
circumstances, they appear to have been at best ineffective. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the impact of corporate governance reforms on the process by 
which executive pay is determined in the UK. The establishment of the Cadbury 
Committee was motivated, at least in part, by concerns over CEO pay and many of the 
requirements of the resulting Code were designed to increase the role of non-executive 
directors, as representatives of the shareholders, in the pay determination process. In the 
event, our results suggest that it has had very little impact across the sample as a whole. 
However, our results are suggestive of considerable heterogeneity in the pay 
determination procedures, particularly when the sample is split by firm size.  
  
The paper examined CEO pay determination in the context of a dynamic model. It had 
been expected that if the Cadbury reforms had the effect of making CEO remuneration 
more directly responsive to firm circumstances –and hence making the individual more 
accountable during his or her tenure of the top job -  then the rate of adjustment would 
have increased in the post-Cadbury period. In the event, the rate of adjustment was 
largely unaffected, except for smaller firms who exhibit a slowing of the speed of pay 
adjustment. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
8 The sampling procedure adopted here required acquiring firms to have made acquisitions within the set of 
quoted companies on the London Stock Exchange. The smaller quoted firms are much less likely to have 
made such acquisitions.   18
It was widely argued by contemporaries that the Cadbury reforms would make CEO pay 
more sensitive to company performance and less dependent upon factors such as firm 
size that were not directly relevant to shareholders. Our results suggest that any increased 
sensitivity in the post-Cadbury era was restricted to CEOs of larger firms and then only 
to those in the lower pay quantiles. Elsewhere, executive compensation appeared very 
largely insensitive to performance, except for the upper deciles of the pay distribution 
among large quoted companies.  By contrast, sales growth emerges as easily the most 
important determinant of CEO pay change, with the strength of this relationship 
increasing as we move up the pay deciles irrespective of the size of firm. This is generally 
unchanged in the post-Cadbury period. However, among larger firms, where the impact 
of corporate governance reforms might have been expected to be at their greatest, the 
compensation-sales growth sensitivity actually increases, especially among CEOs at or 
below the median pay level. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that formalising the 
pay determination process has had the effect of giving more weight to easily measurable 
characteristics such as sales. Similarly, the positive ceteris paribus effect of acquisition 
completion that is manifest among firms above median size, is not at all diminished in 
the post-Cadbury era. If the underlying intention of altering the pay-setting machinery 
was to increase the incentive to boost firm performance and reduce any incentives to 
engage in managerial empire-building then, on our results, Cadbury has failed. 
   19
Bibliography 
Blair, M. M. (1995) Ownership and Control, Brookings: Washington DC. 
Cadbury Report (1992) Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, chaired by Sir 
Adrian Cadbury. (Gee and Co. Ltd. London) 
Conyon, M.J. (1997) ‘Institutional Arrangements for Setting Directors’ Compensation in UK Companies’, 
in Keasey et al (1997). Op cit. 
Conyon M.J. and Murphy K.J. (2000) ‘The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and 
United Kingdom’, 110(467) pp. F640-F671. 
Cosh, A and Hughes, A. (1987) ‘The Anatomy of Corporate Control: Directors, Shareholders and 
Remuneration in Giant US and UK Corporations’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 11, 285-313. 
Dahya, J, McConnell, J and Travlos, N.G. (2002) ‘The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and 
Top Management Turnover’ Journal of Finance, 57, (1), 461-483. 
Ezzamel M. and Watson, R. (1997) ‘Executive Remuneration and Corporate Performance’, in K. Keasey 
and M. Wright, Corporate Governance: Responsibilities, Risks and Remuneration, Wiley: Chichester, pp61-92.  
Girma S., Thompson S. and Wright P.W. (2002) ‘Merger Activity and Executive Pay’, Leverhulme Centre 
for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy, Working Paper 2002. 
Greenbury, Sir Richard (1995) ‘Directors' Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard 
Greenbury’ 
Hart, O.D. (1995)  ‘Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications’, Economic Journal, 105, 678-
89.  
Joskow P. L., Rose N.L., and Wolfram C. (1996) ‘Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: 
Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry’, Rand Journal of Economics, Volume 27, No. 1, spring, 
pp. 165-182. 
Keasey, K and Wright, M. (1993) ‘Issues in Corporate Accountability and Governance’, Accounting and 
Business Research, 23, 291-303. 
Keasey, K., Thompson, S. and Wright, M., (1997) Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and Financial 
Issues, Oxford University Press. 
Koenker R and Hallock K.F. (2001) ‘Quantile Regression’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, 143-56. 
Koenker R. and Bassett G (1978) ‘Regression Quantiles.’ Econometrica 46, 35-50. 
Main, B.G.M. and Johnson, J, (1993) ‘Remuneration Committees and Corporate Governance’, Accounting 
and Business Research 23, 351-62.  
Murphy K.J. (1999) ‘Executive Compensation.’ In O.C. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.) Handbook of 
Labor Economics, volume 3b, North Holland pp2485-2563. 
Joskow P.L., Rose N.L and Wolfram C.D. (1996) ‘Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: 
Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry’, Rand Journal of Economics, 27 (1), pp165-182. 
Shleifer, A and Vishny, R.W. (1997) ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, Journal of Finance, LII, 737-783. 
Whittington, G. (1993) ‘Corporate Governance and the Regulation of Financial Reporting’, Accounting and 








   20
Table 1: Growth Rates of CEO pay by wage percentile pre- and post-Cadbury 
  Annual Wage Growth 
Percentile Pre-Cadbury  Post-Cadbury   
1 -.2498751  -.3335654 
5 -.0948343  -.1480957 
10 -.0385675  -.06142022 
25 .0225692  .0030229 
50 .0695642  .0517628 
75 .1247681  .110436 
90 .2008123  .1878071 
95 .2613202  .2477932 
99 .5088571  .4625874 
Mean .0792718  .0545738 
Variance .0180659 .0206272 
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Table 2: The determinants of CEO pay 
  Mean  q = .1  q = .25  q = .5  q = .75  q = .9 
Last period’s pay  -0.076  -0.110 -0.044 -0.022 -0.019 -0.054 
 (9.04)** (13.22)** (14.34)** (7.39)**  (3.63)** (4.97)** 
Last period’s pay * post Cadbury  0.001  0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (1.00)  (1.34)  (1.32)  (1.49) (0.15) (0.58) 
Industry sales growth  0.022 0.031  0.024  0.038 0.031 0.061 
 (1.23)  (1.19)  (2.20)*  (3.63)** (1.60)  (1.70) 
Industry sales growth*post Cadbury  -0.001 0.001  -0.009  -0.023 -0.003 -0.017 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.70)  (1.82) (0.12) (0.40) 
Sales growth  0.171  0.037 0.091 0.147 0.266 0.321 
 (7.56)** (1.31)  (10.29)** (19.85)** (20.00)** (12.11)**
Sales growth *post Cadbury  -0.024  0.068 0.027 0.017 -0.048  -0.036 
 (0.49)  (1.38)  (1.89)  (1.46) (2.25)*  (0.79) 
Profit growth  -0.000  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.12)  (0.42)  (0.72)  (2.30)* (2.14)* (0.35) 
Profit growth * post Cadbury 0.003  0.001  0.001  0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (1.35)  (0.58)  (0.97)  (2.19)* (2.13)* (0.61) 
Post acquisition effect   0.074 0.083  0.031  0.039 0.071 0.100 
 (7.49)** (6.08)**  (5.32)**  (6.86)** (7.33)** (5.57)** 
Post acquisition effect * post Cadbury  0.007  0.015 0.008 -0.005 -0.022 -0.024 
 (0.47)  (0.76)  (0.90)  (0.58) (1.53) (0.93) 
Observations  7891  7891 7891 7891 7891 7891 
Notes: 
a.  Robust  t-statistics  in  parentheses        
b. * indicates significant at 5%; ** indicates  significant  at  1%       
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Table 3: The Determinants of CEO pay 
Below median employment  (<880) 
  Mean  q = .1  q = .25  q = .5  q = .75  q = .9 
Last period’s pay  -0.116 -0.126 -0.070  -0.047  -0.059  -0.113 
  (8.54)** (7.51)** (13.73)** (10.20)** (6.45)**  (5.56)** 
Last period’s pay * post Cadbury  0.002 0.003 0.002  0.001  0.002  0.003 
 (2.51)*  (1.92)  (3.51)**  (1.93)  (1.90)  (1.53) 
Industry sales growth  0.032  0.080  0.021  0.038  0.052  0.066 
  (1.41) (2.26)*  (1.61)  (2.92)**  (1.86)  (1.05) 
Industry sales growth*post Cadbury  -0.017 -0.054 -0.004  -0.023  -0.026  -0.027 
  (0.67) (1.42) (0.28)  (1.52)  (0.81)  (0.39) 
Sales growth  0.168 0.059 0.097  0.154  0.252  0.305 
  (5.63)** (1.32)  (8.48)**  (17.29)** (14.14)** (8.10)** 
Sales growth *post Cadbury  -0.040  0.033  0.020 0.015 -0.024  -0.051 
  (0.75) (0.57) (1.20)  (1.16)  (0.93)  (0.89) 
Profit growth  -0.000 -0.000 0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.27) (0.51) (1.40)  (1.56)  (0.08)  (0.01) 
Profit growth * post Cadbury  0.003  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.002  0.001 
  (1.29) (0.19) (1.00)  (1.02)  (1.77)  (0.61) 
Post acquisition effect   0.036  0.024  0.003  0.011  0.052  0.139 
  (1.57) (0.72) (0.23)  (0.88)  (2.34)* (3.19)** 
Post acquisition effect * post 
Cadbury 
0.045 0.052 0.029  0.034  0.011  -0.030 
  (1.47) (1.12) (1.66)  (2.01)* (0.35)  (0.49) 
Observations  3855 3855 3855  3855  3855  3855 
Notes: 
a.  Robust  t-statistics  in  parentheses        
b. * indicates significant at 5%; ** indicates  significant  at  1%       
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Table 4: The Determinants of CEO pay 
Above median employment  (> 880) 
  Mean  q = .1  q = .25  q = .5  q = .75  q = .9 
Initial pay  -0.081  -0.132  -0.050 -0.023 -0.010 -0.035 
 (6.40)** (14.40)** (11.76)** (6.74)**  (1.31) (2.06)* 
Initial pay * post Cadbury  0.001  0.002 0.000 -0.001  -0.001  -0.000 
 (0.82)  (1.88)  (0.29)  (2.10)* (1.09)  (0.17) 
Industry sales growth  -0.010  -0.029  0.020 0.025 -0.004  0.023 
 (0.36)  (0.83)  (1.19)  (1.93) (0.14) (0.41) 
Industry Sales growth* post Cadbury 0.034  0.044  -0.012 -0.005 0.035  0.043 
 (1.03)  (1.04)  (0.56)  (0.29) (1.03) (0.60) 
Sales growth  0.168  0.023 0.087 0.127 0.252 0.321 
 (5.18)** (0.84)  (7.05)**  (13.33)** (12.68)** (6.78)** 
Sales growth *post Cadbury  0.105  0.208 0.070 0.077 -0.019  -0.037 
 (1.07)  (3.38)**  (2.47)*  (3.43)** (0.37)  (0.27) 
Profit growth  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 -0.001 0.006  0.009 
 (0.38)  (1.58)  (1.31)  (6.12)** (12.94)** (12.40)**
Profit growth * post Cadbury 0.010  0.013  0.008  0.010 0.001 -0.007 
 (2.51)*  (2.28)*  (2.84)**  (5.21)** (0.36)  (1.04) 
Post acquisition effect   0.055 0.061  0.012  0.031 0.053 0.065 
 (4.84)** (4.66)**  (1.86)  (5.61)** (4.63)** (2.63)** 
Post acquisition effect * post Cadbury -0.006  -0.003  0.009  -0.007 -0.019 -0.016 
 (0.34)  (0.14)  (0.81)  (0.78) (1.02) (0.42) 
Observations  4036  4036 4036 4036 4036 4036 
Notes: 
a.  Robust  t-statistics  in  parentheses        
b. * indicates significant at 5%; ** indicates  significant  at  1%       
 
 
 